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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
The State commenced forfeiture proceedings of money
found on Petitioner Goodson during a search in January of 1988.
Forfeiture petition was filed in February.

Due to inability to

serve Petitioner and other matters, an Answer was not filed until
May.

On September 9th a non-jury trial was held.

Judgment

allowing forfeiture was entered on October 13, 1988. This Appeal
was filed November 3, 1988.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Are Plea Bargain agreements enforceable?
Should the State be estopped from forfeiting seized
funds and breaching its plea bargain agreement when
Petitioners justifiably relied to their detriment
thereon?

In order to support a forfeiture, is the State required
to produce some evidence that funds are cocaine-related
once Petitioner has rebutted presumption that funds in
proximity to cocaine are cocaine-related?
Should forfeiture proceedings be dismissed when a
hearing is not held within the statutorily prescribed
twenty days and prejudice to Petitioner has resulted?
May illegally seized money be forfeited?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 7, 1988, Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputies
executed a Search Warrant for the premises at 1545 South Green
Street #2, Salt Lake Cityf Utah

(TR5).

Petitioner Goodson was

visiting the apartment at the time of the search (TR5).

Although

the warrant did not name Goodson, he was searched (TR 10).
Sheriff's Deputies found on Goodson a small amount of cocaine and
nine thousand one hundred and ninety-nine dollars in cash.

The

State charged Goodson with possession of a controlled substance
and sought to forfeit the funds.
A Plea Bargain agreement was entered into with the Salt
Lake County Attorney.

It was:

Defendant would plead guilty to a Class A
Misdemeanor.
All other charges would be dismissed.
No other charges would be brought for activity to
the date of plea.
The State would waive its right of elocution at
sentencing (TR 23).
Goodson requested as part of the plea bargain that the
seized funds be returned.

The Deputy County Attorney refused but

did agree to not start forfeiture proceedings until Goodson1s
attorney, Petitioner Leedy, could assert and perfect an
attorney's lien on the money (TR 23).

Prior to the plea or consummation of the agreement, new
charges were brought against Goodson.

Another plea agreement was

reached:
Goodson would plead to a felony.
All other charges would be dismissed.
No other charges would be brought for conduct to
date of plea.
State would waive its right of elocution at
sentencing.
A "No Bail" warrant issued for Goodson would be
recalled and he could be released on $10,000
bail.
The funds, nine thousand one hundred and ninetynine dollars, seized in the earlier case would be
released to Richard J. Leedy, Petitioner and
Goodson1s attorney for attorney's fees (TR 24).
This time Petitioner, as part of the plea bargain
agreement, insisted that the seized money be returned.

The

Deputy County Attorney agreed.
A written Stipulation embodying the term that the
seized money be released to Richard J. Leedy was prepared and
executed by the Deputy County Attorney (TR 24).

A Court Order

was entered directing the Sheriff to deliver the seized money to
Petitioner (TR 28).
agreement.

Mr. Goodson performed the plea bargain

He pled guilty to one felony, was sentenced and

surrendered in execution of the sentence; performed the
conditions of probation and is now satisfactorily on probation.
The State performed all but one condition of the plea
bargain.
It dismissed all charges but one felony.
It brought no other charges for conduct to date of
plea.

It waived its right of elocution at sentencing.
Goodson was released from jail pending sentencing
on $10,000 bond.
It did not release the seized funds to Petitioner
Leedy.
Upon being served with a Court Order to release the
funds to Leedy, the Sheriff refused and the County Attorney
proceeded with forfeiture (TR 26).
Although Petitioners filed their Verified Answers in
May of 1988, a hearing was not held until September and no
Judgment until October.
At the hearing the Sheriff's Deputies testified that
the money seized was found in proximity to cocaine but they could
not testify it was cocaine-related (TR 3-14).

Goodson testified

he won the money gambling in Wendover, Nevada (TR 15Z). He
testified he was accompanied by Lisa Martinez who could
corroborate his testimony that he won the money gambling.
However Ms. Martinez was not available as a witness as she had
moved to Green Bay, Wisconsin.

But if the hearing had been held

within twenty (20) days of the Answer, as the statute requires,
Lisa Martinez would have been available, would have testified,
and would have corroborated Goodson that he won the money
gambling (TR 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner Appellant contends that the forfeiture
proceedings should have been dismissed and the seized funds
released to him for five reasons.

1.

A valid enforceable plea bargain agreement was

entered into with the County Attorney requiring release of funds
to Appellant Leedy—Appellants performed all parts of the plea
bargain and Respondents should be required to do likewise,
2.

Appellants justifiably relied to their detriment on

the County Attorney's promise to release the seized funds to
Appellant and Respondent should be estopped from forfeiting the
funds and breaching its agreement.
3.

Forfeiture should have been dismissed when the

State offered no evidence that the seized funds were cocaine
related and the Appellants rebutted the presumption that funds
found in proximity to cocaine are forfeitable with testimony
that the funds were proceeds from legal gambling.
4.

Forfeiture proceedings should have been dismissed

when a hearing was not held within twenty (20) days as the
statute requires and prejudice resulted.
5.

The State should not be allowed to profit by

forfeiting funds that were illegally seized.
POINT I
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENTS ARE ENFORCEABLE
There is no question that the County Attorney's Office
entered into a plea bargain agreement with petitioners and one of
the terms and conditions of that agreement entailed the payment
to petitioner attorney of the nine thousand one hundred and
ninety-nine dollars ($9,199.00) seized from the other petitioner.

The evidence before the Court was that a plea
agreement had been reached which included the following terms:
1.

Defendant Goodson would plead guilty to one felony
count which had a ten year prison term for
punishment.

2.

All other felony charges against Goodson would be
dismissed.

3.

No other charges would be brought against Goodson
for conduct to the date of plea.

4.

The State would waive its right of elocution at
sentencing.

5.

The "No Bail" warrant against Goodson would be
recalled and he would be released from jail until
sentencing on $10,000.00 bail.

6.

Nine thousand one hundred and ninety-nine dollars
($9,199.00) seized from Mr. Goodson would be given
to his attorney Petitioner Richard Leedy. (TR 2325)

The State did not dispute the plea bargain agreement.
Moreover, portions of the plea bargain agreement — including the
portion relating to the release of funds--were reduced to
writing.

There was a signed Stipulation by the Deputy County

Attorney allowing the seized funds to be delivered to petitioner
Richard J. Leedy.

(TR 29-25, 28)

Not only was there a signed Stipulation but a Court
Order based on the Stipulation that ordered the Salt Lake County
Sheriff to deliver the seized funds to petitioner.

(TR 25, 28)

The Sheriff refused to obey the Order (TR 26).
All parts of the plea bargain agreement were performed
by Goodson.

The State performed all parts of the plea bargain

agreement except releasing the funds to Petitioner.

The law is clear that a plea bargain agreement
constitutes an enforceable contract (21 AMJur 2d Criminal Law
Section 485, pg. 794-796.)

A proper remedy for breach of a plea

bargain agreement is specific performance or, in this case,
requiring the State to deliver the seized funds to Petitioner,
Ibid; Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214; United States ex rel
Selikoff v. Commissioner of Corrections, 524 f. 2d 650 Cert.
denied 425 U.S. 951.
POINT II
ESTOPPEL - THE STATE SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM FORFEITING
THE SEIZED FUNDS AND BREACHING ITS PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT
Equitable Estoppel is where a person—or state in this
instance—is precluded from asserting a right—right to forfeit—
because of its conduct or promise.
Equitable Estoppel page 367.

See 31 C.J.S. Section 59

Estoppel arises when a person

justifiably relies to his detriment on the promise of another
Ibid; Restatement Contracts Section 90.

The promise or conduct

in this case is the plea bargain agreement and the provision that
the seized funds would be released.
Detrimental Reliance—Petitioner Goodson relied on the
State's promise to release the seized funds when he hired his
attorney.

He testified he would not have hired the attorney he

did or promise him the fee he promised but for the State's
promise to deliver the funds. (TR 20). Goodson1s attorney
Petitioner Leedy relied on the State's promise by sending his
personal funds to Goodson so he could return to Salt Lake City to
face the charges and perform the plea bargain agreement.

Leedy

testified that after reaching an agreement for the release of the

seized money and obtaining a signed Stipulation to that effect,
he telegraphed his personal funds of approximately twelve hundred
dollars to Goodson (TR 25-26).

Goodson needed money to travel

and money to pay fines in Nevada before he could return to Salt
Lake City and perform the plea bargain.

Leedy also testified he

would not have entered his appearance in the new cases or
undertaken Goodson1s representation but for the State's agreement
to not forfeit and release the seized funds (TR 26).
Justifiable - Was the reliance Justifiable?

Petitioners

would argue that it is always justifiable to rely on the State's
promise.

Additionally, Petitioner Leedy had made similar plea

bargain agreements under similar circumstances in other cases and
the County Attorney had always previously kept his word (TR 31).
Thus, there was justifiable detrimental reliance by both
Petitioners that the seized funds would be released and therefore,
the State should be estopped from forfeiting said funds.
POINT III
THE PRESUMPTION THAT MONEY IN PROXIMITY TO COCAINE
IS COCAINE-RELATED AND FORFEITABLE IS REBUTTABLE AND
ONCE REBUTTED, IT BECOMES THE STATEfS BURDEN TO PRODUCE
EVIDENCE THAT THE FUNDS ARE COCAINE-RELATED
Section 58-37-13(1)(g) Utah Code Annotated provides;
"Everything of value furnished or intended to be
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance
and all moneys . . . used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this act (shall be
forfeitable).
There is a rebuttable presumption that all money,
coins and currency found in close proximity to
forfeitable controlled substances are forfeitable."
(emphasis added) The burden of proof shall be upon
Claimants of the property to rebut this presumption."

Sheriff's Deputy Kendra Herlin testified the money was
found in Charles Goodson!s pocket as was a small amount of
suspected cocaine.

(TR 10)

There was also a small amount of

suspected cocaine on a table near where Goodson sat (TR 6-7).
That raised the presumption.

To rebut the presumption,

Petitioner testified that the money was obtained from gambling in
Wendover, Nevada (TR 15).
The State put on no evidence that the money was cocaine
related; i.e., "furnished in exchange for a controlled substance"
or "used to facilitate any violation of the act."

In fact the

State produced no further evidence.
By statute the Court is to make its determination by a
"preponderance of the evidence," Section 58-37-13(f) Utah Code
Ann.

Even though the Court may not have believed Petitioner

Goodson that he won the money gambling, there was no evidence to
support a finding of cocaine-related—let alone a preponderance.
The only evidence was that a substance suspected to be cocaine
was found in one pocket while money was found in another.

It

may be noted that the possession charges against Mr. Goodson were
dismissed as part of the plea bargain.
POINT IV
FAILURE TO HAVE THE HEARING WITHIN THE STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED
TWENTY DAYS RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO PETITIONERS AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN THE BASIS FOR DISMISSING THE FORFEITURE
The seizure of a person's money without notice and
without a hearing runs closely afoul the due process requirements
of the federal and state Constitution.

In similar circumstances

the United States Supreme Court has allowed seizure procedures to

pass constitutional muster if a hearing is granted soon after
seizure--such as replevin—prejudgment attachment and garnishment.
In the present case, the Utah Legislature attempted to
avoid an unconstitutional taking by providing for an early
hearing after seizure.

Section 58-37-13(g) Utah Code Annotated

provides "Whenever an Answer to a Complaint or Petition appears
of record . . . the Court shall set the matter for hearing within
twenty days."
The Answer or Petitioner's claim was filed May 26th of
1988.

The hearing was held on September 9, 1988 and the Judgment

did not come down for sometime after that.

More than three

months elapsed--not the statutory twenty days.
In State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave) 717 P.2d. 1338
(1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that prejudice plus the
passage of more than one hundred twenty days would be grounds to
dismiss the forfeiture and give the claimants the property.
In this case, Petitioner Goodson testified that Lisa
Martinez was with him in Wendover, Nevada and could corroborate
his testimony about winning the seized money gambling (TR 15-16).
Lisa Martinez had moved to Wisconsin and was not available as a
witness (TR 16). However, she would have been available had the
hearing been within 20 days as prescribed by statute (TR 16-17).
POINT V
THE SEIZURE OF THE MONEY IN THIS CASE WAS THE RESULT
OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND TO ALLOW FORFEITURE WOULD GIVE
THE STATE THE FRUIT OF THE POISON TREE
The Sheriffs entered the apartment where Goodson and the
money were found with a search warrant (TR 4 and 5 ) . The warrant
was only for the premises, not Goodson1s person (TR 5, 13). While

executing that warrant they searched Goodson's person and found
the money (TR 10). Such search and seizure is illegal.

Officers

may not search a person on a premises with a warrant only for the
premises.

(State vs. Vanholten, Utah Court of Appeals, 860 369-

, May 2, 1988.)

To allow forfeiture would grant the State

the poison fruit of its illegal search.
POINT VI
THE STATE MAY NOT FORFEIT ALL OF A DRUG SUSPECT'S
PROPERTY SO THAT HE IS UNABLE TO EXERCISE
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE
May the State forfeit all of a drug suspect's property
so that he is unable to retain an attorney of his choice?

There

is no Utah state law or case interpreting the Utah Constitution.
The Circuits are split.

See U.S. v. Harvey, 814 f.2d 637, 837

f.2d 637 (en banc), (4th Cir 1988), U.S. vs. Monsanto, 836 f.2d 74
852 f.2d 1400 (en banc) (1988), U.S. Thier 801 f.2d 1463 (1986 5th
Cir); U.S. v. Nichols 841 f.2d 1485 (10th Cir 1988).

The United

States Supreme Court has now granted certiorar; in the Monsanto
case, supra to decide the issue under the federal Constitution.
Appellant Goodson testified he had no assets or income and that
since the County Attorney had not kept his promise, he had no
funds with which to pay his attorney.

Appellant would argue that

that rationale of the forfeiture laws is to prohibit a person
from profiting from drug trafficking.

But the exercise of one's

constitutional right is not profiting and therefore, forfeiture
to the extent it interferes with one's ability to exercise his
constitutional right to counsel of his choice should not be
allowed.

CONCLUSION
This case should be reversed and Petitioners awarded
the seized funds.
DATED this

<^

day of March, 1989.

RICHARD J./EEEDY
Attorney/for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, this

jS> day of March, 1989.

